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BRIEF OF APPELLANT RICHARD SIGGARD

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
We respectfully submit that the cross motions for summary judgment raise the same
issue:
Should summary judgment be granted to the party (Mr. Siggard) whose
motion is supported by depositions and affidavits, if he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, when the other parties' (Messrs. Earl and Langs') motion is
not supported by anything but their pleadings?
The pertinent standards for appellate review are the following:
1.

The reviewing court will review the facts in the light most favorable to the

party against whom summary judgment was granted. Larson v. Wycoff Co.,
624P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981).
2.

The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for a
directed verdict. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265,
106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986).

3.

Where a party submits no documents in opposition to summary judgment, the
moving party may be granted summary judgment, if he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INVOLVED

Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ P., provides in pertinent part as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * *
Rule 56(e), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent part as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Richard Siggard, initiated this lawsuit in January 1990, as the seller
under a uniform real estate contract entered into in September 1978, hereafter "first
contract," to assert the remedy of foreclosure under the contract when the annual payment
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due July 10, 1989, was not paid.
Messrs. Earl and Lang filed an amended counterclaim involving the first contract and
two additional uniform real estate contracts entered into in December 1978. As to each of
the three contracts1 Messrs. Earl and Lang asked that the stipulation in each contract for
liquidated damages—reducing the purchase price of each of the contracts by $600 per
acre—because culinary water was not provided to the parcels of land involved by July 1,
1989.
The case was presented to the district court on cross motions for summary judgment
on all issues except that Mr. Siggard reserved the issue of attorney fees.
The district court refused to foreclose the first contract and denied Mr. Siggard's
motion for partial summary judgment.
The district court granted Messrs. Earl and Lang's motion for summary judgment and,
in doing so, (1) applied the liquidated damages, stipulation in the contracts to recalculate the
remaining principal and interest balance of each contract and (2) ordered Mr. Siggard to
secure the release of the three parcels from the obligations of a contract which he (and his
deceased wife) entered into in 1977 with Mr. and Mrs. Prescott, hereafter the "Prescott
contract," under which the Siggards purchased the three parcels and other lands, some 240
acres in all. (R. 265; Appendix.) The Prescott contract has not yet been fully executed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
None of the following facts has been contradicted by Messrs. Earl and Lang. The

Each of the three contracts was made on a printed uniform real estate contract form.
(R. 259, 261, 263.)
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facts are presented under the two issues raised by the judgment below.
Reduction of purchase price for nondelivery of water
In 1977 Richard Siggard and his wife acquired the right, by the Prescott contract, to
purchase some 240 acres of land near the town of Francis in Summit County, Utah. (R. 265;
deposition of Richard Siggard, pp. 7, 9.) The land is situated approximately 6V2 miles
northeast of the Jordanelle reservoir now under construction near Heber City, Utah.
On June 5, 1978, Mr. Siggard and his wife entered into the first contract (R. 259)
with Messrs. Earl and Lang (and their wives) to sell them a 20 acre parcel from the 240 acres
of land the Siggards were buying under the Prescott contract. In December 1978 the parties
entered into a second contract for another parcel of 20 acres, a third contract for a parcel of
10 acres and a fourth contract for a parcel of 10 acres, all from the land under the Prescott
contract. (R. 261, 263.)2
The first contract calls for an annual payment of $6,000; the second contract calls for
an annual payment of $3,750; and the third contract calls for an annual payment of $1,650.
The payments are to be made on July 10 of each year until the contracts are paid in full.
Each of the three contracts required the Siggards, as the sellers, to provide culinary
water to the parcels within four years from the dates of the contracts. The earliest time to
provide water would be in June 1982 under the first contract. The parties stipulated to a

2

The fourth contract is not involved in this case and is not one of the exhibits. Mention
of the parcel of land in the fourth contract as Mr. Earl's "Keogh property" is found in some
of the correspondence involved in this lawsuit The fourth parcel was released by the
Prescotts and conveyed by Mr. Siggard to Mr. Earl, after payment in full, in November
1983.
4

reduction of the purchase price of each contract by $600 per acre if water should not be
provided. The pertinent language in the first contract reads as follows (the second and third
contracts contain substantially the same language) (R. 259):
Culinary water will be provided to the property within four
years by the Seller or the total purchase price shall be reduced
by $600.00 per acre.
The parties' contracts were prepared by a title company in Heber City, Utah, and
reflected the parties' entire agreement, as of 1978, with respect to the delivery of water.
(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 10-11, 15-16.)
Messrs. Earl and Lang had no immediate intention of doing anything with the parcels
in 1978. They were planning for commercial use and for subdivisions of the parcels when a
market for the land would open up with the completion of the Jordanelle Reservoir. There
was no particular reason for the four year deadline in which to provide water to the parcels.
(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 9, 11, 13, 18; deposition of William R. Lang, p. 7.)
The contracts contained none of the "criteria" and "conditions" that were later asserted
by Messrs. Earl and Lang in 1988-89 as to the quantity of water to be provided and as to the
location of the distribution lines for the water.
In 1982, before the time for providing water to the first parcel had arrived, the
savings in principal payments to Messrs. Earl and Lang from a reduction of the purchase
price of each of the three contracts—covering a total of 50 acres—would have been $30,000
(50 acres x $600). The savings in interest calculated from 1982 over the remaining life of
the contracts, at the contract rate of SVi%9 would have been approximately $27,600.
Before the time for providing water in 1982, Messrs. Earl and Lang told Mr. Siggard
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that they preferred to have water delivered in the future rather than take the $600 per acre
reduction of the purchase price of each of the three parcels. The date for providing water
was extended to June 1983. (First affidavit of Richard Siggard, 1 2 (R. 255).) The
extensions were later confirmed by letter in December 1982. (R. 276.) Mr. Siggard did not
provide water to the parcels in 1982 because as explained by him, in his deposition (p. 22):
they [Messrs. Earl and Lang] said they didn't need it at this time, and it
was a situation in which if I put it in it would be sitting for a long
period of time.
In the summer of 1983 Mr. Siggard completed a successful well to provide
water for the three parcels. The well was drilled to a depth of 135 feet, an 8" casing was
installed, and the well was capped and sealed to protect the casing from oxidation. The well
produced 80-100 gallons of water per minute. (Deposition of Richard Siggard, pp. 25, 35;
first affidavit of Richard Siggard, 1 3 (R. 255).)
After the well was completed, Mr. Siggard explained to Messrs. Earl and Lang the
reason for not laying the distribution lines from the well to their parcels at that time. (First
affidavit of Richard Siggard, 1 3 (R. 255.) He repeated the explanation in his deposition (pp.
26-27, 35):
I explained to Parker Earl and Bill Lang that unless they had a need for
that water, if that casing was unsealed and even if a pump was put on it
that it would deteriorate within a year and a half, be completely
destroyed.
Also in 1983, the parties agreed that in the future water should be provided to the
parcels when necessary or actually needed, rather than on a date certain. Mr. Siggard stated,
in his first affidavit (R. 255):
4. The three of us agreed that bringing water to the lots
6

would be postponed until the water was actually needed.
This modified agreement was confirmed in an exchange of letters in 1987. The first
letter, from Messrs. Earl and Lang, dated July 1, 1987, states the agreement as follows (R.
278):
Bill and I would also appreciate it if you would direct a letter to
our attention indicating in writing that since June 27, 1983, which was
the deadline for delivery of the water, that you understand we have
given you an extension on that until at such time it may be necessary or
we need to have water to the property. Would you please indicate in
writing your commitment to us on the 10 acres under my Keogh [not
involved in this lawsuit], the 10 acres north of my Keogh, the 20 acres
south of Mr. Toome's home and the 20 acres on the corner of Foothill
and Page.
Mr. Siggard responded by letter on July 8, 1987, in which he said (R. 279):
It is agreed by the undersigned, Richard Siggard, that when Culinary water is
actually needed it would brought to the property.
A year later, in a letter of June 6, 1988 (R. 280), Messrs. Earl and Lang again
confirmed the agreement for providing water when "actually needed." They also told Mr.
Siggard that there was a "specific need" for water on the third (10 acre) parcel which Earl
and Lang had subcontracted to sell to a Mr. and Mrs. Clark. As it later developed, the sale
to the Clark's was not completed because of their divorce. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl,
pp. 18-19, 29, 39.)
In the third paragraph of their June 6, 1988, letter, Messrs. Earl and Lang laid down
several "criteria" as being "necessary for us to accept the delivery of water" (R.280):
For clarification, if you choose to bring the water, the following criteria
are necessary for us to accept the delivery of water as provided in the
contract:
1.

The amount of culinary water needed will be 1 acre foot per
7

year per family, which is considered the standard. The number
of families is based on the zoning, which we interpret to be one
family for every 100 feet of frontage on a county road.
2.

The size pump, storage tank, and pipe shall be sufficient to
provide that water.

3.

The waterline to the North should be located along the county
road within the required front yard setback, avoiding as many
trees a^ possible. We should coordinate on specific location.

4.

Although we are requesting a decision in writing by July 1,
1988, should you elect to deliver culinary water, the water will
not be required to be delivered by July 1, 1988. However, the
water system has to be built and capable of delivering the supply
of water requested above by July 1, 1989.

The three contracts, as prepared in 1978 (R. 259, 261, 263), contained nothing with
respect to the number of families to be served (one every 100 feet) and the location of water
lines. Mr. Siggard did not agree with the "criteria" but said, by letter of June 23, 1988, that
he would meet the requirement of the contracts (R. 212):
Apparently the time has come for the seller, my wife has passed
away, to comply with the contracts and provide culinary water to the
properties involved. As the Seller it is my to meet this requirement of
the contracts and as you have requested by July 1, 1989. The routing
of the water lines to your property has already been discussed with both
of you in the past.
Some time in the first half of 1989, Messrs. Earl and Lang had approached Summit
County for zoning changes for the three lots. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 55.) They
learned that they might not be able to have their lots subdivided and might not be able to sell
as many parcels as they had intended. It also appears to have been about the same time that
they decided that the three lots could be sold without water. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl,
pp. 63-64.)
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In a letter of March 1, 1989, Messrs. Earl and Lang withdrew the "criteria" as to the
number of families to be served but told Mr. Siggard that they would not accept water unless
he met the following "conditions," none of which were part of the original contracts (R.
281):
In order to accept culinary water in lieu of the reduction of
$600/acre on our 60 acres as per the contracts between us, we will
require that the following conditions be met:
1. One pipe be run north from the well to the south property
line of the north 10 acre contract (Parker's Keogh north line) on the
east side of the Beaver and Shingle Creek canal in an easement
mutually agreeable with Mr. Earl. The water line shall conform to
present Summit County requirements for culinary water line
construction. Another pipe be run across the road from the well to our
corner 20 acres. Another from the well to our south 20 acres.
2. That the capacity of the well, pump and culinary water
storage tank be sufficient to supply four (4) dwelling units, one on each
parcel as per current State and County Board of Health,and Planning
and Zoning requirements as to quantity, quality and fire protection.
3. Transfer to us of water ownership for the required acre feet
involved (as per Summit Co. Planning and Zoning requirements) to
protect future landowner interests.3
According to Mr. Earl, Mr. Siggard's work on the water project in June 1989 was
"aggressive." (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 89.) In the month of June, however, Mr.
Siggard received oral instructions that he not install the pipe for the water lines before there
was a discussion as to where the lines would be located. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp.

3

The escrow accounts for the three contracts provide that the water company shares
placed in escrow would be delivered upon payment of the contracts. (First affidavit of
Richard Siggard, 1 8 (R. 255)).
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42, 48, 49, 89, 91, 93 and 94.) The oral instructions were confirmed by letter from Messrs.
Earl and Lang dated June 12, 1989, in which the following was stated (R. 283):
Dick the time is quickly upon us and we are concerned that it could be
initiated without our review, so please do not install the pipe before we
all review your plans. * * *
But for the instructions not to install pipe, Mr. Siggard would have taken water to the
parcels, believing that there was a need for water. (First affidavit of Richard Siggard, t 5
(R. 255); second affidavit, 1 2 (R. 293).)
On June 22, 1989, Mr. Siggard wrote to Messrs. Earl and Lang that he would be
able to get a copy of a water system drawing to them in a few days. (R. 216.) The drawing
was sent to them by letter of July 11, 1989. (R. 220.) Mr. Siggard's plans were not
reviewed by Messrs. Earl and Lang. They chose, instead, to not speak to Mr. Siggard about
the drawing he sent them and the location of the distribution lines because the drawing was
received after July 1. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 94-95.)
Depositions disclosed that there never was an actual need for water, apart from the
anticipated need of the Clarks, which need evaporated when they withdrew from their
contract with Messrs. Earl and Lang, because of their divorce. There were no other potential
buyers for any of the three parcels in 1988 or 1989. In all the years from 1978 to 1989,
Messrs. Earl and Lang lost no offers to buy land for lack of water. (Deposition of W.
Parker Earl, pp. 18-19, 29, 39, 55; deposition of William R. Lang, pp. 7-8.)
There is no evidence of pecuniary loss or damage suffered by Messrs. Earl and Lang
at any time. There is no evidence of culpable delinquency on the part of Mr. Siggard.
There is no evidence that the failure to take water to the property was solely his fault.
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Messrs. Earl and Lang chose, in Mr. Earl's words, to "act upon the contract rather
than the water" because of "gray areas"—non water problems—that had arisen between the
parties in the years after the contracts were entered into. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p.
86.)
Messrs. Earl and Lang knew their payments on the three contracts would go through
escrow accounts to the Prescotts (Mr. Siggard's sellers) and that nonpayment would "have an
effect on Mr. Prescott's eventually getting his payment. * * * There was a discussion
somewhere along the line that [Mr. Siggard] was going to have to borrow the money to pay
[the Prescotts] * * *."

(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 31, 33, 72-73.)

When Messrs. Earl and Lang decided to withhold the annual payment of $6,000 due
on the first contract in July 1989, their purpose was to bring financial pressure to bear on
Mr. Siggard or, in the words of Mr. Lang, to obtain "leverage" over Mr. Siggard—to "focus
his mind on the problem"—and to force him to agree to adjust the contract balance on the
three contracts to reflect a credit due them of $600 per acre calculated from 1982.
(Deposition of William R. Lang, pp. 16-19.)
The remaining principal balances on the contracts as written are approximately
$85,000 in all. The district court reduced the purchase price of each contract and then
recalculated the interest owing on each as of 1982, leaving a total remaining balance on the
three contracts of $43,035.16 in all.
Release of the three parcels by the Prescotts
The Prescott contract, entered into in 1977, provides for releases as follows (R. 265,
268):

11

15. It is understood that a reasonable release of property shall
be considered by the Sellers. However, in no event will any release be
granted which would jeopardize the rights of the Sellers, nor shall any
property be released prior to December 1981.
Messrs. Earl and Lang knew of the Prescott contract when the parties three contracts
were entered into. (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, p. 13.) As to releases, the first contract
(20 acres) contains the following sentence (R. 259):
2. * * * Partial releases may be granted in fourth year
after the date hereon.
The second contract (20 acres) contains nothing regarding releases. (R. 261.)
The third contract (10 acres) contains only the following sentence relating to releases
(R. 263):
3. * * * It is provided in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract that partial releases of land may be granted in the
fourth year after date of said Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Each of the parties' three contracts (R. 259, 261, 263) expressly acknowledges that
there is an obligation against the property in the form of the Prescott contract. (1 6.) Each
contract obligates Messrs. Earl and Lang as the buyers to assume and pay any penalty which
may be required on prepayment of prior obligations. (19.) Each contract provides for the
delivery of title subject to encumbrances mentioned. The Prescott contract is the
encumbrance mentioned in the contracts. (119.)
Mr. Earl obtained a release from the Prescotts in 1983 when he paid in full for the 10
acre parcel under the fourth contract (not involved in this lawsuit). The Prescotts have also
given releases to two other buyers from Mr. Siggard. (First affidavit of Richard Siggard (R.
255).)
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No evidence was presented that the Prescotts will not release the three parcels upon
payment to the Prescotts of the amounts due on the three contracts as written.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I
Summary judgment should have been entered for Mr. Siggard, as the moving party,
when Messrs. Earl and Lang failed to support with facts the essential elements of their
case—the existence of an agreement to provide water whenever they directed, and the
existence of any damage. They failed to establish that there was a genuine issue for trial.
II
There are several reasons why the stipulations in the contracts for liquidated damages,
if water should not be provided within a time certain, should not have been applied in this
case:
(1) The parties had agreed, before the time to provide water had arrived, to extend
the date and then had agreed to postpone the delivery of water until it should actually be
needed. This agreement of the parties effectively eliminated the stipulation for liquidated
damages from the contracts.
(2) There was no actual need for water in 1989 or at any time.
(3) The only thing Mr. Siggard failed to do in 1989 was to build the distribution
system for water that Messrs. Earl and Lang chose to insist upon without first obtaining Mr.
Siggard's agreement. Messrs. Earl and Lang have suffered no damage.
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Ill
The judgment's provision that Mr. Siggard must secure a release of the three parcels
from the Prescott contract is contrary to the provisions of the three contracts—the parties
having contracted with knowledge of and expressly subject to the Prescott contract. The
district judge who heard and decided the case ordered that a deed from Mr. Siggard be
subject to the Prescott contract. The judgment signed by the successor judge did not include
that provision.

ARGUMENT
We will first address the standard of Rules 56(c) and (e), U.R.Civ.P., as they apply
in a case where parties fail to establish the existence of the essential elements of their case.
We will then address the question whether Mr. Siggard is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
I
MR. SIGGARD'S MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED,
ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD OF RULE 56, U.R.CIV.P.
The essential elements of the case of Messrs. Earl and Lang, the elements on which
they would bear the burden of proof at trial, are the existence of an agreement to the effect
that water was to be provided to the three parcels whenever Messrs. Earl and Lang should
direct and that they suffered damage. No evidence of such an agreement or of damage was
provided by them either in support of their own motion or in response to Mr. Siggard's cross
motion.
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The essential elements of Mr. Siggard's case are that the parties' agreement was
modified in 1983 to the effect that water would be provided thereafter when actually needed
and that there was no need for water in 1989. Mr. Siggard stated his position by deposition
and affidavit; the position is supported by the parties' correspondence which all parties accept
as authentic. Messrs. Earl and Lang, in spite of every opportunity to do so, and being under
no pressure of time, did not contradict that position even with affidavits of their own.
Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment should be rendered
forthwith:
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The purpose of Rule 56 is to pierce the pleadings in order to determine whether there
is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder and, where there is not such an issue, to
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when it is clear, as a matter of law, that the
party ruled against is not entitled to prevail. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren,
692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed.
2d 265, 106 S Ct. 2548 (1986) (Rule 56 should be construed with due regard for the rights of
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis).
The view of the Supreme Court of the United States on the application of Rules 56(c)
and 56(e) in a case where a factual basis is not provided for a claim, is found in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 273 and 274 (1986):
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
15

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.
* * *

Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond
the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
This has been the law in Utah for some time. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah
1982) (a party may be granted summary judgment where the opposing party submits no
documents in opposition and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment).

The

abundance of time and the briefing opportunities—with both parties filing supporting
memoranda and reply memoranda—has served in this case to isolate and to dispose of, as
being factually unsupported, the claim of an agreement that water would be provided
whenever directed by Messrs. Earl and Lang and the claim of damages.
II
THIS IS NOT A CASE FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
A. The contracts were modified to eliminate the requirement that water be provided
before it was needed:—In recalculating the remaining balances of the contracts as of 1982,
the district court accepted the premise, stated in the first full sentence on page 2 of the Earl
and Lang memorandum filed in the district court, that there was a series of promises to
provide culinary water when directed by Messrs. Earl and Lang (R. 235, 236):
In return for a series of promises to furnish culinary
water when directed by defendants, defendants extended the time
for Siggard to furnish culinary water to the subject properties.
16

Unfortunately, the district court overlooked or ignored the fact that there is nothing in
the record, apart from counsel's statement, to support such a premise. The uncontradicted
record shows that what the parties actually did was to modify their contracts with respect to
the time for delivering water.
The parties modified their contracts on two occasions. The first was in 1982 when
they agreed to extend to 1983 the time for providing water. The following statement from
Mr. Siggard's first affidavit states the reason why water was not provided in 1982 (^ 2 (R.
255)):
In 1982, before I was to provide water to the three lots
purchased by Parker Earl and William Lang, they had no need
for water at their lots and told me that they would rather have
water delivered in the future than have a reduction of the
purchase price of the lots. The time for providing water was
extended and the letter to me dated in December 1982 confirmed
our agreement.
Mr. Siggard's affidavit is the sole evidence of the reason for water not being provided
in 1982. Mr. Siggard has stated, without contradiction, that the parties agreed, before water
was to be provided in 1982, to extend the time to 1983 and later confirmed this by letter.
Thus, there was no default in 1982.
The second modification of the parties' contracts occurred in 1983 when the parties
agreed that water would be provided thereafter when "actually needed." (See the confirming
letters of December 10, 1982, July 1, 1987, July 8, 1987, and June 6, 1988, discussed above
at pages 5-6 (R. 278, 279).) There is no evidence in the record to the contrary.
Parties may change their views and the requirements of their agreement as to time of
performance. Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1988).
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As stated in Maryland Steel Co. v. United States, 235 U.S. 451, 35 S. Ct. 190, 192 (1915):
Undoubtedly parties may agree that time shall be of the essence
of their contract, and, the proper legal conditions existing, may
stipulate for damages and the measure of them, but they may
subsequently change their views and requirements, and consider
that performance within the stipulated time is unimportant.
The contracts having been modified, "the terms thereof prevail over inconsistent terms
in the original contract in governing the rights and obligations of the parties." Ted R. Brown
and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., supra, 753 P. 2d at 968 (Utah App. 1988).
B. The stipulation for liquidated damages was eliminated from the
contracts:—Messrs. Earl and Lang are trying to do in this case what the federal government
could not do in Maryland Steel Co., quoted from above,—to obtain the benefits of a
stipulation for liquidated damages after the time for performance had been waived. The
government was successful in the United States Court of Claims but the United States
Supreme Court reversed.
The facts of Maryland Steel Co., are remarkably similar to those of the present case.
Briefly, the facts of that case are as follows: (1) the contract provided a time for completion
and a stipulation for liquidated damages for delay; (2) the government had the right to annul
the contract upon default of the steel company, but preferred to retain the contract and extend
the time of its execution; (3) the time limit was orally waived and subsequently confirmed by
letter; (4) there was no unreasonable delay of the work after the waiver of the time limit; (5)
there was no actual pecuniary loss or damage by reason of the delay; and (6) there was no
culpable delinquency on the part of the steel company.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the parties' stipulation as to time of
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performance, of which the liquidated damages was a part, was waived and by being waived
the liquidated damages stipulation was eliminated trom the contract.
If Messrs. Earl and Lang's expectations were frustrated in 1989, they may seek
recovery from Mr. Siggard only for a breach by him of the parties' contracts as modified.
Any pre-modification contractual rights to the contrary "must be deemed waived or excused."
Rapp v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189 (U. 1980). As this Court stated
(606P.2dat 1192):
Our only concern is whether either party breached the
contract by failing to perform according to its terms as modified,

C. No water was needed in 1989:—The question whether Mr. Siggard was required,
to provide water to the parcels by July 1, 1989 should have been decided in the light of these
uncontradicted facts: (1) Mr. Siggard had demonstrated his good faith and the availability of
water by bringing in a successful water well in 1983; (2) the parties recognized a "potential
of damage to the well of going any further with the delivery of water * * * before the water
could be put to use;" (3) the parties agreed that water should be provided in the future when
"actually needed;" and (4) there was no actual need for water because the Earl and Lang sale
of the third parcel to the Clarks fell through when the Clarks' were divorced. (R. 278, 279;
deposition of W. Parker Earl, pages 18-19, 29, 39.)
The parties' decision to wait until there should be an actual need for water was a wise
one. "Public policy and common sense oppose the waste of installing a culinary water line to
serve land which, for all that appears, will remain unused." Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545,
549 (Utah.App. 1989).
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The trial court in the Bell case (quoting from the opinion of the court of appeals (782
P.2d at 546):
saw no purpose in requiring installation of culinary water
facilities to serve rather remote property not intended for
residential use, and held that the Elders were required by the
contract to be merely able to furnish water to the subject
property by October 15, 1980, and that they were required to
actually furnish the water to the property only if the Bells had
obtained a building permit and were about to construct a house,
so that the water would be put to "beneficial use."
The Bell case stands for the principle, among others, that where there is no need for
water at the property, the promisor is only required to be able to furnish culinary water to the
property when needed. 782 P.2d at 546-547. The principle of the Bell case is what the
parties in this case actually agreed to in 1983 and confirmed in writing in 1987—that water
should be provided when actually needed.
When Mr. Siggard agreed by letter of June 23, 1988, to provide water by July 1,
1989 (R. 212) it was in response to an express representation of Messrs. Earl and Lang in
their letter of June 6, 1988, that there was a "specific need" for water on the 10 acre parcel
they had contracted to sell to the Clarks (R. 280). But that need evaporated with the Clarks"
marriage. Messrs. Earl and Lang had also learned in 1989 that the three parcels probably
could not be subdivided and they had decided that the parcels could be sold without water.
(Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 55, 63-64.)
There is no evidence of the existence of an actual need for water on any of the parcels
at any time. There is also no evidence that the parties further agreed that water should be
provided, "contrary to public policy and common sense," Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d at 549, in
the absence of an actual need for water.
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We respectfully submit that without evidence of actual need for water at the three
parcels, Mr. Siggard was not in breach of the parties' modified agreement in 1989. Thus,
there was no default so far as providing needed water was concerned in 1989.
D. There was no agreement on the water delivery system demanded by Messrs. Earl
and Lang in 1989:—The actual dispute in 1988-89 was not over the availability of water, but
over the size and location of the water delivery system. (R. 280.)
The water system Messrs. Earl and Lang deemed necessary required a quantity of
water, based upon the number of families anticipated, and a location of distribution lines
which were not agreed upon in 1978. The "criteria" and "conditions" were not presented to
Mr. Siggard in 1988 and 1999 as subjects for negotiation to correct an omission of the
parties' in their preparation of the original contracts. Rather, the water system was presented
as something without which Messrs. Earl and Lang would not accept a delivery of water.
Their letter of June 6, 1988, made the point as follows (R. 280):
For clarification, if you choose to bring the water, the following criteria
are necessary for us to accept the delivery of water as provided in the
contract:
Their letter of March 1, 1989, was just as specific (R. 281):
In order to accept culinary water in lieu of the reduction of $600/acre
on our 60 acres as per the contracts between us, we will require that the
following conditions be met:
What Messrs. Earl and Lang did, in effect, although none of the parties appears to
have been aware of it, was to signal an anticipatory repudiation—a species of breach—of the
contracts; a positive and unequivocal manifestation that they would insist upon terms which
were not in the three contracts. United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., Etc., 681 P.2d
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390, 429-434 (Ariz. App. 1983).
The insistence of Messrs. Earl and Lang, could not obligate Mr. Siggard, without his
prior agreement, to provide a water delivery system according to their specifications.
E. Messrs. Earl and Lang caused or contributed to the delay in putting in a delivery
system and they suffered no damage:—Although Mr. Siggard's work on a delivery system had
been "aggressive" in June 1989, he received oral and written instructions to "not install the
pipe before we all review your plans." (Deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 89, 42, 48, 49,
91, 93-94 (R. 283).)
What was Mr. Siggard to do when faced with a demand to perform according to terms
not agreed upon, followed by an order not to install the pipe? He said that he would have
taken water to the three parcels but for the letter of June 12, 1989. (Second affidavit of
Richard Siggard (R. 292).) His affidavit is not contradicted.
There is no evidence that the failure to have the Earl and Lang water system in place
was solely Mr. Siggard's fault. There is no evidence that the Earl and Lang instructions to
"not install the pipe" were not sufficient to account for any failure to meet their July 1, 1989,
deadline for a delivery system.
One who causes a delay cannot avail himself of that delay, Cannon v. Steven School,
560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977). Such a one is not entitled to recover for a resulting failure to
meet a completion date, even under a stipulation for liquidated damages. Higgins v. City of
Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 (Utah 1981).
We submit that it was not unreasonable for Mr. Siggard to have stopped his work and
that the district court should have viewed Messrs. Earl and Lang as the parties who caused
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the work to stop.
If Messrs. Earl and Lang were not the sole cause of the work stopping, they at least
contributed to that stoppage, according to the uncontradicted affidavit of Mr. Siggard, when
they gave the oral and written instructions to "not install the pipe" and chose to not comment
upon the drawings sent them by Mr. Siggard's letter of July 11, 1989. (Second affidavit of
Richard Siggard (R. 292); deposition of W. Parker Earl, pp. 42, 48, 49, 91, 93-94.)
One who contributes to delay is precluded from obtaining liquidated damages for the
delay. Higgins v. City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192, 193, fn. 2 (Utah 1981); Peter Kiewit
Sons' Co. v. Pasadena City Jr. Col Dist., 379 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1963).
The stipulation for liquidated damages in the three contracts could have been
considered appropriate in 1978 as a reasonable forecast of just compensation for possible
actual damage to be sustained in the future, if water should not be available when needed.
Such damages would be essentially compensatory in nature. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623
(Utah 1982). But in 1989, the well having been completed, and there being no need for
water, and there being no evidence of damage sustained, the liquidated damages were out of
all proportion to reality. See Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985).
Ill
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACTS
SUBJECT TO THE PRESCOTT CONTRACT
The part of the district court's judgment, entered July 9, 1991 (R. 315), directing Mr.
Siggard to obtain releases of the three parcels from the obligations of the Prescott contract
(R. 265), is contrary to the provisions of the parties three contracts which were entered into
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with knowledge of the Prescott contract (R. 259, 261, 263; deposition of W. Parker Earl, p.
14).
The Prescott contract contains the following provision as to releases (R. 268):
15. It is understood that a reasonable release of property shall be
considered by the Sellers. However, in no event will any release be granted
which would jeopardize the rights of the Sellers, nor shall any property be
released prior to December 1981.
There is nothing in the parties' first contract that requires Mr. Siggard to obtain a
release from the Prescott contract. The first contract speaks only of partial releases from the
20 acre parcel it covers and no such releases have been requested (R. 259):
2. * * * Partial releases may be granted in fourth year
after the date hereon.
The second contract, also for 20 acres, says nothinig of releases. (R. 261.)
There is nothing said in the parties' third contract, for 10 acres, about Mr. Siggard
obtaining a release from the Prescott contract (R. 263):
3. * * * It is provided in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract that partial releases of land may be granted in the
fourth year after date of said Uniform Real Estate Contract.
In addition, each of the three contracts acknowledges the obligation of the Prescott
contract and expressly provides for the delivery of a deed conveying title subject to the
encumbrance of the Prescott contract. (See 11 6 and 19 (R. 259, 261, 263).)
The district judge who heard and decided the case (Noel) ordered that a deed from
Mr. Siggard would be subject to the Prescott contract. (See the Minute Entry for June 3,
1991 (R. 300).) The judgment submitted to the successor district judge (Wilkinson) and
signed by him did not contain that provision but, instead, requires Mr. Siggard to obtain
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releases from the Prescotts. (R. 315.)
The judgment's requirement that releases be obtained from the Prescotts cannot be
supported on the record.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be reversed and
the case remanded with directions that Mr. Siggard's motion for partial summary judgment be
granted; that the motion of Messrs. Earl and Lang be denied; that Mr. Siggard have judgment
that the price of each contract is not to be reduced for nondelivery of water in 1989 and that
he is not obligated to secure releases of the three parcels from the Prescotts.

Respectfully submitted,

Claron C. Spencer
SPENCER & ANDERSON
Attorneys for appellant Richard Siggard
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD SIGGARD,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

VS.

W. PARKER EARL, BETTY ANN
EARL, WILLIAM R. LANG and
SUSAN L. LANG,

Civil No. 10530
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for
hearing and decision before the above-entitled court on June 3,
1991.

Plaintiff appeared by and through his counsel, claron

Spencer of Spencer and Anderson.

Defendants appeared by and

through their counsel, R. Scott Howell of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau.

Upon stipulation of counsel, the Court ordered that

the depositions of William Lang, Parker Earl and Richard Siggard
be published.

Plaintiff seeks an order of foreclosure of certain

real property covered by a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Defendants seek specific performance of three Uniform Real Estate

mw
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Contracts.

The Court reviewed the pleadings, depositions,

affidavits and memoranda on file, and heard oral argument of
counsel for both parties.
The Court finds persuasive the argument of defendants as set
forth in Points I, II & III of their Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.

For the reasons and upon the bases

therein stated summary judgment in favor of defendants is
appropriate.
As prevailing party in this lawsuit, defendants are entitled
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

Attorneys1 fees

and costs in the amount of $12,500.00 have been substantiated by
the Affidavit of R. Scott Howell, and the court finds such fees
and costs reasonable.

This amount has not been contested by

plaintiff either in his motions and memoranda or at the hearing
that took place on June 3, 1991.
It appearing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact precluding the entry of summary judgment and that defendants
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

denied.
2.

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and

specific performance under the three Uniform Real Estate
Contracts is ordered as follows:
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A.

The total amount owing by defendants to plaintiff

as of July 10, 1990 under the three Uniform Real Estate Contracts
is £40,374.38 calculated as follows:
(1) Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on September
5, 1978, covering real property identified in the first paragraph
of Exhibit "A" hereto:
Principal
Interest at the contract
rate of 8.5% through July 10, 1990

$27,964.51

Total

$32,920.52

(2)

$ 4,956.01

Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on December

27, 1978, covering real property identified in the second
paragraph of the Exhibit "A" hereto:
Principal
Interest at the contract rate of
8.5% through July 10, 1990

$ 936.03

Total

$1,015.60

$

79.56

(3) Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on December
27, 1978, covering real property identified in the third
paragraph of Exhibit "A" hereto:
Principal
Interest at the contract rate of
8.5% per annum through July 10, 1990

$5 , 933.88

Total

$6,438.26

$

504.38

Defendants are awarded their attorneys1 fees and costs of
$12,500.00, which shall be offset against the amounts owed on the
contracts, leaving a balance owed as of June 3, 1991, on the
three contracts calculated as follows:
3
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Total owed as of July 10, 1990
Interest on principal ($34,834.42)
from 7/10/90 to 6/3/91 @ 8.5%

$40,374.38

Principal and interest as of 6/3/91
Less Attorneys' Fees and Costs

$43,035.16
(12,500.00)

Balance owed as of 6/3/91

$30,535.16

2,660.78

Per diem interest = $7.11
B.

Defendants shall, within fifteen (15) days of the

date this order shall be entered by the Court, deliver into the
registry of this court, a certified check made payable to the
clerk of this court, in the amount as provided in paragraph (2)
above.

Upon delivery of such sums to the clerk of the court, the

obligations of defendants shall cease accruing interest.
C.

Within thirty (30) days after delivery by

defendants of such sums to the court in the manner stated in
paragraph (2)(B) above, plaintiff shall secure releases of all
liens and encumbrances created by, or arising through, plaintiff
including all right, title, interest and claim currently held by
Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Prescott in the subject properties under the
Uniform Real Estate Contract that predates the contracts entered
into by and between plaintiff and defendants.

Plaintiff shall

also, and within the thirty (30) day period, deliver unto
defendants warranty deeds to each of the properties covered by
the three contracts and shall also deliver to defendants all
other property including irrigation water rights which plaintiff
agreed to deliver to defendants under the terms of the three
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contracts.

Upon written stipulation by defendants that plaintiff

has performed hereunder, the Court will enter an order directing
the clerk of the court to turn over to plaintiff all of the funds
delivered by defendants into court together with interest, if
any, that has accrued thereon.

In the event of objections by

defendants to plaintiff's performance, such objections shall be
promptly filed with the court and set for hearing.
3.

The award of attorneys' fees provided herein may be

augmented by supplemental affidavit of additional attorneys' fees
and costs as are reasonably incurred by defendants in pursuing
and obtaining the relief herein adjudicated.
DATED this

a

day of

/ \/&*~s\ ^ -

, 1991

BY

>-^s
Judge J^a
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Claron Spencer, Attorney
for Plaintiff
RSH583
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EXHIBIT "A
Paragraph 1
The North one-half of the NW1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 28,
T2S, R6E, SLBM containing 20 acres more or less together with
one-half of the mineral rights and a proportionate share of the
irrigation water rights of the former WAYNE PRESCOTT DAIRY RANCH.
Paragraph 2
Beginning at a point 990.00 feet North of the Southeast
corner of Section 21, in Township 2 South of Range 6 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 330.0 feet,
more or less, to a fence line; thence West 1230 feet, more or
less, to the fence line on the East bank of the Beaver and
Shingle Creek Irrigation Company canal; thence Southwesterly
along a fence line to a point directly West of the point of
beginning; thence East 1360 feet, more or less, to the point of
beginning.
Paragraph 3
Beginning at a point 330 feet South of the center of the
intersection of Page Lane and East Loop Road between Kamas and
Francis-Woodland being 1320 feet West and 330.0 feet South of the
Northeast corner of Section 28, in Township 2 South of Range 6
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running then East
500.00 feet; thence South 45°00' East 212.1 feet; thence East
440.0 feet; thence South 840 feet; more or less, to fence line;
thence West to the center of the Kamas-Francis Woodland Road;
thence Northwesterly along the center line of said road to the
place of beginning. Area 20.00 acres, more or less.
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